In Violent Agreement with Stan Greenberg
Pollster’s critique of Deciding to Win proves the thesis. Sometimes word for word.
The British have an idiom meaning strong, emphatic, almost comically intense agreement.
To be in “violent agreement” is to have alignment without harmony, to agree on facts but disagree on framing or tone.
In the eight weeks since Deciding to Win was published, critics have often been in violent agreement.
Throwback Throwdown
Legendary pollster Stan Greenberg took to the pages of The American Prospect today with a concisely titled critique: Deciding to Win is both “flawed” and will “help Democrats.”
Greenberg frames his essay as a takedown, and puts the report in context of intra-party debates going back to the 1980s and 1990s (he juxtaposes Bill Clinton’s reading of his work versus that of Bill Galston and Elaine Kamarck,credited as inspiration for Deciding to Win, and that he was not called).
But strip away the personal dynamics and ideological throat-clearing, and something else emerges: agreement on the fundamentals. Over and over again.
Let’s go to the tape.
1. Democrats are losing moderates and the middle
Greenberg doesn’t hedge here. He states it plainly:
“The study’s authors are right that Democrats have to address their losses with moderate voters.”
That is the starting premise of Deciding to Win. The party has a persuasion problem, not a turnout problem, and it’s concentrated among moderates and working-class voters.
Greenberg agrees.
2. The Democratic Party is elite-captured and out of touch
This is the heart of Welcome’s longstanding argument, and Greenberg endorses it directly:
“Advocacy groups and academic and foundation elites have shaped a Democratic Party that rarely speaks about the economy, cost of living, and middle class and is deeply out of touch…”
In this context, “People vs. the Powerful” is not a critique of “move to the center”, but a rebranding for the progressive readership of The American Prospect. Which is fine!
It’s not voters dragging the party left. It’s institutions, nonprofits, funders, and professional elites reshaping Democratic priorities in ways ordinary voters do not like.
3. Voters want an economic focus, not identity primacy
Greenberg leans heavily on Deciding to Win’s survey data to make this case:
“Three-quarters or more of voters want Democrats to prioritize ‘protecting Social Security and Medicare,’ ‘lowering everyday costs,’ ‘making health care more affordable,’ and ‘creating jobs and economic growth.’”
He adds:
“Almost two-thirds say ‘cutting taxes on the middle class’ should be a priority. Over half want Democrats to prioritize ‘raising taxes on the wealthy.’”
That’s not triangulation, that is exactly what the report calls for.
4. The party is seen as ‘too liberal’, and that’s unsustainable
Again, full agreement:
“More people view Democrats as ‘too liberal’ than view Trump Republicans as ‘too conservative.’ That is not sustainable.”
You can dislike the framing. You can debate the implications. But you can’t dispute the problem, and Greenberg doesn’t.
5. Crime, immigration, gender, and America matter electorally
Greenberg restates one of the report’s most uncomfortable conclusions almost verbatim:
“You cannot win this electoral battle for the middle class if so many voters view your party as out of touch on crime, immigration, gender, and America being exceptional.”
That sentence could be lifted directly into Deciding to Win without editing.
6. The platform analysis is valid, and damning
Greenberg explicitly endorses one of the report’s most discussed methods:
“The Deciding to Win analysis of words used in the 2012 and 2024 Democratic Party platforms is a reasonable way to look at shifting national Democratic priorities.”
He then accepts the conclusion: less economy, less middle class, less responsibility—more identity, more abstraction, more elite language.
7. Biden damaged the Democratic brand
Another point of convergence:
“The report highlights Joe Biden’s historic unpopularity and impact on the party’s brand.”
No footnotes. No caveats.
So what’s the disagreement?
Not the diagnosis.
Greenberg agrees that Democrats:
Are losing moderates
Are out of touch
Talk too little about the economy
Are overly shaped by elite institutions
Struggle on crime, immigration, and culture
Need to fight for the middle class
The disagreement is about framing, not facts. Greenberg has been influential in the party longer than any of the report’s authors have been alive, and is known as a savvy operator. This is a classic case of “credibility transfer”. Greenberg is preemptively disparaging the source’s credibility before presenting a fact that comes from that source, specifically because the audience will reject the fact if they think it’s coming from “them.” (“Them” being Welcome centrists).
At one point, Greenberg sneers:
“Do these data rats ever get out of the basement and see that there is a worsening climate crisis?
We’ll own that one. Greenberg’s DC-based firm is entering its 46th year. No one on the Welcome team lives in DC. We are on the youth soccer sidelines, at the block parties, in the bars, and in the pews with the rest of the scurrying voters in this country who want Democrats in DC to listen. We are in the data, but also in red districts around the country listening to the voters, so Win The Middle slate candidates can represent them. And win.




The mechanism of elite capture was in part the replacement of mass membership institutions with professionalized advocacy groups whose influence is donor-driven rather than constituency-driven.
Michael Lind's The New Class War offers the clearest framework for this. Unions once served as vehicles for working-class representation because they had to answer to their members. When union density collapsed from roughly 30% to under 10%, Democrats didn't lose just an electoral bloc. They lost the feedback loop that kept them tethered to working-class concerns. What filled that vacuum was a constellation of nonprofits, foundations, and advocacy organizations staffed by credentialed professionals who claim to represent constituencies they don't actually answer to.
Immigration is the clearest case study. In 2002, there was just a five-point gap between Democrats and Republicans on the importance of reducing illegal immigration. By 2021, that gap had grown to 54 points, driven almost entirely by a 37-point shift leftward among Democrats. This wasn't because Latino voters demanded it. A 2024 NPR/Marist poll found that 57% of Latinos agreed the U.S. should deport all immigrants who entered illegally. The shift happened because advocacy groups like NCLR, CASA in Action, and the National Day Laborer Organizing Network convinced party elites that immigration liberalization was the key to locking in Latino support. As Celia Muñoz and Frank Sharry acknowledged after 2024, "elected leaders followed Progressive advocates to the left, beyond the political space available to them."
The problem isn't that advocacy groups have bad intentions. Many are motivated by genuine moral conviction and have drawn attention to real injustices. But moral clarity is not the same as representational clarity. These organizations shape party messaging without meaningful accountability to the communities they claim to represent.