The Awkward Politics of Evasion

Democrats' uncomfortable yet necessary next steps.

After a series of brutal defeats in which Democrats went 1 for 6 in presidential elections, Elaine Kamarck and Bill Galston wrote the seminal essay, Politics of Evasion in 1989. In it they argued:

Democrats have ignored their fundamental problems. Instead of facing reality, they have embraced the politics of evasion. They have focused on fundraising and technology, media and momentum, personality and tactics. Worse, they have manufactured excuses for their presidential disasters -- excuses built on faulty data and false assumptions, excuses designed to avoid tough questions. In place of reality they have offered wishful thinking; in place of analysis, myth.

Listening to the discourse concerning the future of the Democratic Party after the 2024 election cycle, it’s impossible to not see its relevance today.

As of the end of January 2025, Democrats have:

• Skirted responsibility on why Harris lost, failing to admit or disclose what they should have done differently.

• Seen petitions within the Party made to institute a 32-hour work week by progressive Hill staffers.

• Perpetuated the failed identity politics and alphabet soup culture of the Party that excludes more than it includes.

• Argued Congressional Hispanic Caucus Frontline members should “message better” instead of actually changing their votes and positions on issues.

• Continued a full-throated progressive resistance against the Trump Administration without offering any indication that there will be opportunities for collaboration or bipartisanship — something voters desperately want.

As a “big tent” party, these are natural challenges to see after a Party faces defeat. But what we lack in cohesion, we make up for in consistency: Democrats are really good at pointing fingers and not taking responsibility for their actions. And voters are increasingly picking up on and taking note of that.

Consider the DNC Chair race¹. Ben Wikler has focused on auditing consultants, investing in helping parties “organize and communicate,” a “permanent campaign,” “turnout,” and “making sure everyone’s at the table.” But there’s been no mention of the Party’s actual positions on immigration, inflation, or crime – and why the positions themselves are the problem. These explanations are the politics of evasion: “fundraising and technology, media and momentum, personality and tactics.”

The message is fine, Democrats tell us, the problem is “communication,” “organizing,” and “turnout.”

We’re Not The Only Ones

At Vox, Eric Levitz makes a compelling case that these explanations don’t hold water (responding to the views of progressive Michael Podhorzer) and concludes:

It seems entirely possible that Democrats could win the White House in 2028 without moving right on any issue, not least because Biden and Harris already moderated the party’s stances on immigration and crime considerably. At present, Democrats appear more likely to moderate excessively on immigration than insufficiently, with most of the party lining up behind the reckless Laken Riley Act in recent days.

And Podhorzer is surely not wrong that Democrats should seek to increase the salience of Trumpism’s most extreme aspects, nor that the party should speak to voters’ discontent with the economic system (although, it is important not to mistake anti-institutional sentiment for lockstep backing of the entire progressive economic agenda).

Nevertheless, I think it’s important for Democrats to be clear-eyed about the nature of their problems. The party’s failure to retain credibility on economic management, immigration, and crime made some Americans see MAGA in a better light. Some of that failure is attributable to bad luck. But Democrats will still be ill-equipped to preempt similar setbacks in the future if they refuse to admit that this one occurred. Trump really did win the 2024 election. There’s no use in denying it.

Further, Levitz accurately sums up a crucial point that many fail to understand about America’s voters: “Low-propensity voters are less ideological than reliable ones, and voters often choose to sit out elections because they are conflicted, agreeing with some of what each party has to say.”

Levitz’s piece demolishes the traditional progressive arguments for the Democratic Party’s failure: lack of mobilization and lack of effective messaging – the same thing progressives blamed in the 70s and 80s – and correctly recalibrates the problems being with the Party itself, rather than with the voters.

The Awkward Politics of Evasion

The desire among the consultant class of the Democratic Party to blame the failures of the election on messaging and narrative exists because, frankly, it’s easier to. Messaging and narrative are a problem, but Democrats also made concrete policy choices that harmed them.

To name a few poor policy choices:

• The size of the American Rescue Plan (ARP) worsened inflation and fed into the perception that Democrats were not concerned about inflation or the national debt.

• The Biden Administration’s prioritization of student loan debt cancellation convinced non-college voters the party didn’t care about them. Not to mention, the Department of Education’s focus on former college students contributed to an inability to do the basics: the federal student aid application system broke down.

• The obsessive focus on climate and electric vehicles fed the perception that Democrats don’t care about rising gas prices and only want to help those wealthy enough to buy expensive cars.

• After running on a platform of unity and bipartisanship, Biden broke with a bipartisan tradition of adding a member of the other party to his cabinet.

• Though not a policy choice per se, Biden’s age was not merely a messaging problem: He was too old to be President, and Democrats lied about that fact.

• The Biden Administration permitted a large increase in unauthorized border crossings and addressed the issue (too) late in their leadership term.

The problem with bringing up these issues is that they divide the party. This is the awkward part of the awkward politics of evasion. It’s uncomfortable to discuss whether your party priorities are off or alienating. It’s easier to commit to “showing up in communities,” “engaging on new platforms,” and “fighting misinformation.”

And due to the simple political nature of politics, it’s also understandably awkward for members of the same party to openly disagree with one another on messaging, votes, and policy positions. If you think talking about politics at your family’s Thanksgiving dinner with distant relatives is hard, think about how hard it must be for literal colleagues who interact daily to disagree with one another. Necessary, but challenging.

Many party insiders begin with the assumption that Americans share the preferences of Democrats and are merely deceived by “disinformation.” But the reality is that the Democratic Party holds views that are hostile to the American public on issues like immigration, crime, and government spending.

The Groups

The awkward politics of evasion are driven by the growing power of “the groups:” the amorphous blob of interests aligned with the Democratic Party on issues like climate, healthcare, abortion, racial justice, and others.

Pre-Trump, “the groups” were treated as another special interest. Like realtors or financial professionals, they had interests they sought to advance. While politicians may have been generally supportive of the goals of the interest groups, they understood that these are still interest groups, and they should be treated as such. Claims should be evaluated, and policies should not be taken up whole cloth. Their polling is likely to be rosy and not perfectly reflective of reality.

In other words, Democrats did better due diligence.

These days, Democratic politicians treat “the groups” not as a special interest, but as a critical part of the Democratic governing coalition. Abortion bills are written by abortion rights groups, LGBTQ+ bills by the LGBTQ+ groups, gun control bills by the gun safety groups. Politicians use language directly from the groups and trust polling commissioned by the groups. This takes some burden off of their staffs, but they often eventually learn far too late in the legislative process that they have been saddled with an unpopular and extreme policy idea.

Further, progressive politicians have moved away from believing the job of a lawmaker is to represent voters and have instead embraced the idea that they should be the tip of the spear of cultural change - in other words, they should be activists, not politicians.

This shift explains why Democratic politicians have been quick to embrace vogue social ideas that are anathema to voters like defunding the police, referring to women as “birthing people,” and decriminalizing border crossings. Progressive politicians feel they should use their social media channels and earned media to force new ideas onto voters rather than make policies that can address voters’ actual concerns. This misunderstanding would be bad enough, but it ends up tarnishing the Democratic brand a great deal since these progressive politicians are often the flavor of the Democratic Party voters see and hear from the most (and the ones Republicans are delighted to broadcast).

Conclusion

Where do we go from here? It can feel awkward to break with Democrats, but the failure to do so makes it harder to earn trust among voters. Democrats must reject the politics of evasion and embrace moderation. After all, moderates win, and before Democrats can govern, they must actually win elections. If progressives are going to attack moderates, they need to first address their own policy and messaging failures – man in the mirror, anyone?

Nuance within the Democratic brand helps voters trust Democrats more: the more voters see Democrats who have diversity in thought, the more voters can believe Democrats when they say they’ll serve people over the Party. Without it, those claims are hollow. We must embrace the process of allowing policymakers to carve out their own approach to policy.

1. DNC Chair candidates have notably also dodged the question of whether or not Biden should have run again.